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COMMENT
A COMMON LAW CRIME ANALYSIS OF
PINKERTON V. UNITED STATES: SIXTY YEARS OF
IMPERMISSIBLE JUDICIALLY-CREATED
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Michael Manning*
I. INTRODUCTION
Gary, Indiana was named the homicide capital of America
many times in the 1980s and 1990s.1 More than 70% of the
murders in Gary are drug-related, and crack cocaine is especially
prevalent.2 Thus, it is probably not particularly noteworthy that
William Curtis and Jamell Rouson, two young men from Gary,
joined a gang and began distributing crack cocaine. They were
eventually arrested and convicted for their drug activity. Curtis'
involvement in the drug trade was limited to the drugs, but
Rouson's involvement included committing two murders. One
would expect Curtis to be punished for distributing cocaine and
Rouson to be punished for both distributing cocaine and commit-
ting murder. It seems almost illogical to suggest that Curtis could
* J.D. Candidate, University of Montana School of Law, 2006. I would like to thank Mark
Parker for being kind enough to let me take his idea of Pinkerton as a common law crime and run with
it. The theory is his, I simply explored it further. I would also like to thank Andrew King-Ries for
taking time out of his schedule to work with me. His help and suggestions were invaluable. Finally, I
would like to thank my parents, John and Robin Manning, for their unwavering support in whatever I
do.
1. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG POLICY INFORMATION CLEARING-
HOUSE: GARY, INDIANA, PROFILE OF DRUG INDICATORS (2003), http://www.whitehousedrug
policy.gov/statelocallin.ingary.pdf (January, 2003).
2. Id.
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be convicted of murders in which he took no part simply because
he and Rouson dealt drugs together. However, this is precisely
the result under a troubling conspiracy doctrine created by the
United States Supreme Court.3
In 1946, the United States Supreme Court decided Pinkerton
v. United States4 and drastically altered federal conspiracy law.
The Court created what is now commonly referred to as the "Pin-
kerton theory of liability,"5 "Pinkerton liability,"6 or simply the
"Pinkerton theory."7 Pinkerton liability allows for a party to a con-
spiracy to be found guilty of substantive offenses committed by a
co-conspirator that were committed in furtherance of the conspir-
acy.8
In the nearly sixty years since Pinkerton was decided, the the-
ory has become well-established and widely used, although it is
used almost exclusively in the federal system.9 Today, courts
often enumerate three specific elements that the government
must prove to meet its burden of proof for Pinkerton liability. 10
The elements are:
(1) [tlhat a conspiracy existed in that there was an agreement be-
tween individuals to align themselves with others in a criminal ven-
ture; (2) [t]hat having so aligned themselves together, one or more
of them acted to commit the substantive offense; and (3) [t]hat the
substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the criminal
venture in which the defendant had aligned himself with others.11
Additionally, the substantive acts must be reasonably foreseeable
as a "necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy." 12
Pinkerton has been written about extensively and attacked on
a number of grounds. 13 However, very little, if anything at all,
has been written about the possibility that the United States Su-
preme Court created a federal common law crime when announc-
3. United States v. Curtis, 324 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2003).
4. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 356 F. Supp. 2d 470, 474 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1336 (11th Cir. 2005).
7. See, e.g., Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 101 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003).
8. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647.
9. Westlaw reveals that Pinkerton has been cited by courts over 4,000 times, Westlaw
Home Page, http://www.westlaw.com (enter citation for Pinkerton, then follow "Citing Ref-
erences" hyperlink).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2001).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Westlaw's "KeyCite" function indicates that 258 law review articles cite Pinkerton,
as do 3 ALR annotations and over 2,200 other secondary sources. A Westlaw search for
"Pinkerton" in Journals and Law reviews returned nearly 1,300 results.
Vol. 67
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ing the Pinkerton theory of liability. A common law crime is a
crime created or defined by a judge rather than by a legislature. 14
Though a minority of states have retained common law crimes in
some form, 15 common law crimes have long been deemed imper-
missible in the federal system.16
Without delving into the debate about federal common law
crimes 17 or attacking Pinkerton on other grounds, this Comment
takes the view that Pinkerton impermissibly creates criminal lia-
bility when Congress has not done so and thus violates the prohi-
bition on federal common law crimes. Part II of the Comment will
first look at the Pinkerton case itself, as well as Justice Rutledge's
strong dissent. Part III will examine the various ways Pinkerton
liability is applied in practice today. Part IV will offer a brief look
at the history of the applicable criminal law, particularly federal
common law crimes. Finally, Part V will examine whether Pinker-
ton liability is itself a common law crime, and argue that for all
intents and purposes it is indistinguishable from such and the ul-
timate result is the same.
II. PINKERTON V. UNITED STATES
A. Facts of the Case
Walter and Daniel Pinkerton were brothers indicted for viola-
tions of the Internal Revenue Code.' 8 Each was indicted on one
count of conspiracy and ten substantive counts. 19 The Pinkertons
were tried before a jury and found guilty. Walter was convicted of
conspiracy and nine of the substantive counts. 20 Daniel was con-
victed of conspiracy and six of the substantive counts. 21
The Pinkerton brothers were bootleggers. The evidence
showed that Walter and Daniel had conspired to illegally possess
and transport whiskey and they were convicted of conspiracy
14. BLAciKs LAW DICTIONARY 399 (8th ed. 2004).
15. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-303 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.01 (2005); and VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-16 (2004).
16. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
17. At least one author has recently made an argument that there is a substantial vari-
ance between the supposed blanket prohibition of federal common law crimes and the real-
ity of the development of the law. Ben Rosenburg, The Growth of Federal Criminal Com-
mon Law, 29 Am. J. CRIM. L. 193, 194 (2002).
18. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
2006
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based on this evidence. 22 Walter "was the direct actor in some of
the substantive offenses" and committed the offenses in further-
ance of the brothers' conspiracy. 23 Walter alone committed these
offenses. 24 There was no evidence to show that Daniel partici-
pated in the commission of any of the substantive offenses for
which he was convicted. 25 In addition, no evidence indicated that
Daniel aided or abetted Walter in committing these offenses or
that he even knew Walter committed them.26 In fact, Daniel was
incarcerated at the time Walter committed some of the substan-
tive offenses. 27
B. Majority Decision
Though not specifically enumerated, the Pinkerton Court de-
cided two issues. The first was whether the Pinkerton brothers
could be convicted of conspiracy and the substantive offenses
when all of the substantive offenses were committed in further-
ance of the conspiracy. 28 The Court concluded that separate con-
victions for the conspiracy charge and the substantive charges
were appropriate.29 This holding sets forth the hallmark rule of
conspiracy: a conspiracy is a separate offense from the substantive
crime that was the object of the conspiracy.
To reach this result, the Court reasoned that there are several
instances when it is inappropriate to add a conspiracy charge to a
substantive offense. 30 The first is when there is "no ingredient in
the conspiracy which is not present in the completed crime."31
The second is when the definition of the substantive offense specif-
ically excludes one who participates in another's crime from pun-
ishment for conspiracy.32 After describing these two situations,
the Court noted that their applicability is limited and stated, "[it
has been long and consistently recognized by the Court that the
commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit
22. Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 645 & n.5 (majority opinion).
24. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 645 (majority opinion).
26. Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 642 (majority opinion).
29. Id. at 642-44.
30. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 643.
31. Id. (citing United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 355 (1926); Gebardi v. United
States, 287 U.S. 112, 121 (1932)).
32. Id. (citing Gebardi, 287 U.S. 112).
Vol. 67
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it are separate and distinct offenses. The power of Congress to
separate the two and affix to each a different penalty is well estab-
lished."33 Citing numerous cases in support of this rule and gen-
eral conspiracy law, the Court concluded that the Pinkertons
could be convicted for both conspiracy and the substantive of-
fenses because the agreement to do an unlawful act is distinct
from the actual doing of the act, and both are punishable. 34
Having decided the first issue, the Court turned to the second
issue and the one with which this Comment is primarily con-
cerned. The second issue facing the Court was whether Daniel
Pinkerton could be convicted of substantive offenses when there
was no evidence that he participated in their commission, but the
evidence showed that Walter Pinkerton committed them in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. 35 The majority concluded that because
Daniel was a member of the conspiracy and the substantive of-
fenses were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, Daniel
could be held responsible even though he did not directly commit
the offenses. 36
At the time Pinkerton was decided, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit had previously determined in United
States v. Sall that merely being a member of a conspiracy was not
enough to warrant punishment for substantive offenses commit-
ted in furtherance of the conspiracy. 37 However, the Pinkerton
Court overruled Sall and instead combined general conspiracy law
with a Ninth Circuit case applying these general principles to sub-
stantive offenses to create an opposite rule.38 Among the general
principles upon which the Supreme Court relied was that an overt
act of one conspirator may be an overt act of all without a new
agreement, 39 motive or intent may be proved by acts of some con-
spirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, 40 and all members are
responsible for a conspiracy even though only one member com-
mitted the act which was the purpose of the conspiracy. 41 The
33. Id. (citing Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1895)).
34. Id. at 644.
35. Id. at 645.
36. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647.
37. 116 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1940).
38. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647 (citing Johnson v. United States, 62 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.
1932)).
39. Id. at 646-47 (citing United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910)).
40. Id. at 647 (citing Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 657-58 (1896)).
41. Id. (citing Cochran v. United States, 41 F.2d 193, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1930); Mackett
v. United States, 90 F.2d 462, 464 (7th Cir. 1937); Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533,
540 (8th Cir. 1940); Blue v. United States, 138 F.2d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 1943)).
2006
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Court also noted that the conspiracy was ongoing and there was
no evidence that Daniel withdrew from the conspiracy. 42
Relying on these principles, the Court reasoned that criminal
intent is established by the formation of the conspiracy and the
commission of an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 43 The
Court also cited 18 U.S.C. § 88 for the proposition that an overt
act is required for a conspiracy and further noted that for pur-
poses of conspiracy law, an overt act of one conspirator is an overt
act of all conspirators. 44 Based on this reasoning, the Court con-
cluded, "[iif [the overt act] can be supplied by the act of one con-
spirator, we fail to see why the same or other acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy are likewise not attributable to the others for the
purpose of holding them responsible for the substantive offense."45
The Court did, however, distinguish substantive offenses not com-
mitted in furtherance of the conspiracy or which were not foresee-
able.46
C. The Dissent
Justice Rutledge disagreed with the majority that Daniel
could be convicted for Walter's substantive crimes and argued
that such a holding subjected Daniel to double jeopardy.47 Justice
Frankfurter joined Justice Rutledge's dissent as to the issue of
whether Daniel could be convicted of the substantive offenses. 48
Justice Rutledge offered several compelling arguments as to
why it should be impermissible to convict Daniel for Walter's
crimes. The first and most compelling was that such a holding
"violates both the letter and spirit" of Congress' separate classifi-
cation of the following crimes: "(1) completed substantive offenses;
(2) aiding, abetting, or counseling another to commit them; and (3)
conspiracy to commit them."49 These three classes of crimes are
not identical.5 0 Justice Rutledge argued that allowing a conspira-
tor to be convicted of a co-conspirator's crimes "either convicts one
man for another's crime or punishes the man convicted twice for
42. Id. at 646.
43. Id. at 647.
44. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 648-54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 654 (Frankfurter, J. substantially concurring with J. Rutledge's dissent).
49. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 649 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
50. Id. (citing Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 611 (1946); United States v.
Sall, 116 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1940)).
Vol. 67
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the same offense."51 He believed that the differences between the
three classes of crimes are easily disregarded, and when such a
disregard occurs, a person may be convicted of one offense based
on proof of another, or multiple punishments may be imposed.52
Justice Rutledge's second misgiving was that the law of con-
spiracy was moving toward broad discretion for prosecuting of-
fenses that included a "looseness which with the charge may be
proved" and an "almost unlimited scope of vicarious responsibility
for other's acts which follows once agreement is shown."53 He was
concerned that the majority's holding was an expansion of this
power, and that in Daniel's case, this expansion violated at least
the spirit, if not the letter, of a "constitutional right."54
Rutledge agreed with the Third Circuit's reasoning in Sall
that aiding and abetting and conspiring were not intended by
Congress to be the same thing and differ only in descriptive word-
ing.55 He noted if the only difference between aiding and abetting
and conspiring was in the descriptive wording, the result would be
double punishment for the same act. 56 In Pinkerton, there was
evidence to show that Daniel and Walter conspired to commit acts
of the same general character as that of Walter's substantive
acts. 57 There was no evidence to show that Daniel committed the
substantive acts or that he counseled, advised or even had knowl-
edge of the acts. 58 As Justice Rutledge points out, without the
conspiratorial agreement, Daniel was guilty of no crime. How-
ever, under the majority's reading, the existence of the conspirato-
rial agreement made Daniel guilty of two or more crimes. He was
directly liable for conspiracy and vicariously liable for the sub-
stantive offenses.5 9 Essentially, Justice Rutledge reiterated his
argument that the majority blurred the line between the three
classes of crimes and convicted Daniel of both conspiracy and sub-
stantive offenses based only on evidence that he was guilty of con-
spiracy.
Justice Rutledge also took issue with the convictions for the
substantive offenses because a previous indictment charging only
51. Id.
52. Id. at 649-50.
53. Id. at 650.
54. Id.
55. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 651 n.4 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 651.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 651-52.
2006
7
Manning: A Common Law Crime Analysis of Pinkerton V. United States
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2006
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
conspiracy was dismissed. 60 Following the dismissal, the Pinker-
ton brothers were indicted again for many of the same acts. 61 The
Government, and presumably the majority (which did not address
this issue), contend that the indictments charged two different
conspiracies, alleviating any double jeopardy issues. 62 Justice
Rutledge agreed that to avoid double jeopardy, the two conspira-
cies charged must have been "separate and distinct."63 However,
he noted that for Daniel to be convicted of Walter's substantive
offenses, there could have been only one conspiracy spanning the
entire time frame. 64
III. PINKERTON LIABILITY IN PRACTICE TODAY
The Supreme Court's ruling that Daniel Pinkerton was re-
sponsible for his brother's bootlegging opened the door for prosecu-
tors to charge conspirators with any number of additional sub-
stantive offenses based on the actions of co-conspirators. Today,
Pinkerton liability is used to convict defendants of substantive of-
fenses in a wide variety of contexts. Technically, a defendant can
be charged for a substantive offense via Pinkerton liability any
time a co-conspirator commits a foreseeable substantive offense in
furtherance of the conspiracy. The general rule of Pinkerton lia-
bility is often stated something like the following:
[The] Pinkerton doctrine . . . permits the government to prove the
guilt of one defendant through the acts of another committed within
the scope and in furtherance of a conspiracy of which the defendant
is a member, provided the acts are reasonably foreseeable as a nec-
essary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.
65
Thus, under Pinkerton, a defendant may be found "guilty on a sub-
stantive count without specific evidence that he committed the act
charged if it is clear that the offense had been committed, that it
had been committed in the furtherance of an unlawful conspiracy,
and that the defendant was a member of that conspiracy."66
60. Id. at 652.
61. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 652 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 652-53. Although the double jeopardy implications are not particularly im-
portant to the argument set forth here, this point of the dissent is worth noting as it pro-
vides yet another argument against convicting Daniel Pinkerton for his brother's substan-
tive offenses.
63. Id. at 653.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2001).
66. United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1208 (2d Cir. 1975).
Vol. 67
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Based on recent published case decisions, it appears that Pin-
kerton liability is most often used in practice today in conjunction
with drug and firearm offenses, though its application is certainly
not limited to such offenses.
A. Drug Offenses
Pinkerton is regularly applied to drug conspiracies. 67 The ap-
plication of Pinkerton liability in drug conspiracies, and in all
other cases in which Pinkerton is applied, normally takes place
through a jury instruction, appropriately named the "Pinkerton
instruction."68
When given a Pinkerton instruction in a drug conspiracy case,
the jury is free to use Pinkerton as a vehicle to convict a defendant
of possession of controlled substances, possession with intent to
distribute, or some other substantive offense even when the defen-
dant never actually possessed any drugs. A good example of such
a conviction is found in United States v. Navarrete-Barron.69
In Navarrete-Barron, law enforcement officers arrested Jaime
Garcia and found fourteen ounces of crack cocaine in his posses-
sion.70 Officers also found more than fifty grams of cocaine base in
Garcia's possession. 71 Based on their investigation of Garcia, po-
lice officers were soon led to Luis Jesus Navarrete-Barron and ar-
rested him as well.72 At trial, evidence indicated that Navarrete-
Barron had participated in numerous drug transactions and con-
spired with Garcia to possess and distribute both cocaine and ma-
rijuana.73 Although Navarrette-Barron was not in possession of
the cocaine base, he was convicted for possession of cocaine base
with intent to distribute. He then appealed that conviction. 74
The Eighth Circuit upheld Navarrete-Barron's conviction
based on Pinkerton liability.75 The court found that there was suf-
67. United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 567 (7th Cir. 2000).
68. The Pinkerton instruction simply restates the law discussed above. See supra text
accompanying note 65. For example, the Pinkerton instruction in Smith read, "[a] conspir-
ator is responsible for the acts of any other member of the conspiracy if he was a member of
the conspiracy when the act was committed, and if the act was committed in furtherance of
or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy." Smith, 223 F.3d at 567.
69. 192 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 1999).
70. Id. at 789.
71. Id. at 792-93.
72. Id. at 789.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 792.
75. Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d at 792-93.
2006
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ficient evidence that Garcia possessed the cocaine base, and also
sufficient evidence that Navarrete-Barron and Garcia were mem-
bers of a conspiracy. 76 In addition, the court found that Garcia
possessed the cocaine base in furtherance of the conspiracy with
Navarette-Barron and that Garcia's possession was foreseeable to
Navarrete-Barron. 77 These findings were based largely on Gar-
cia's testimony that Navarrete-Barron handled the cocaine base
the previous day.78 Even though Navarrete-Barron was never
found to be in possession of cocaine base, his convictions for both
conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute were upheld
based solely on Pinkerton liability.
Another excellent example of the application of Pinkerton lia-
bility in a drug case is United States v. Hayes,79 a case that relies
on Navarrete-Barron. In Hayes, Elijah Hayes was convicted of one
count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to dis-
tribute crack cocaine and one count of possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine.80 His conviction for conspiracy was
largely based on testimony that he was part of a drug selling oper-
ation with Fred Dodd from 1992 until 2003.81 A number of wit-
nesses testified that Hayes received drugs from Dodd, sold drugs
for Dodd and helped Dodd divide and package cocaine. 82
Hayes' conviction for the substantive crime of possession with
intent to distribute, on the other hand, was based entirely on
Dodd's actions. Hayes was arrested as a result of police surveil-
lance of a residence in Davenport, Iowa.83 Police observed Hayes
and Dodd leave the residence in Dodd's car.84 The police pulled
over the vehicle in an area known for drug trafficking and ar-
rested both Hayes and Dodd.8 5 A police officer observed clear
plastic in Dodd's hand and later testified that seven baggies con-
taining crack cocaine found in the car were the same baggies he
observed in Dodd's hand.86 Hayes was not carrying any drugs.87
76. Id.
77. Id. at 793.
78. Id.
79. 391 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2004).
80. Id. at 959.
81. Id. at 961-62.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 960.
84. Id.
85. Hayes, 391 F.3d at 960.
86. Id.
87. Id.
Vol. 67
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After the arrest, police also searched the Davenport residence and
found cocaine.88 The apartment did not belong to Hayes.8 9
On appeal, the Government conceded that Hayes did not have
actual or constructive possession of the cocaine found at the Dav-
enport residence for which he was convicted. 90 Nevertheless, rely-
ing on the trial court's proper Pinkerton instruction to the jury
and the reasoning in Navarrete-Barron, the Eighth Circuit upheld
Hayes' conviction for possession of cocaine. The court held that
the "elements" required for Hayes' conviction were all met: 1)
Dodd possessed cocaine; 2) Hayes and Dodd were members of the
same conspiracy at the time of the possession; 3) Dodd's posses-
sion was in furtherance of the conspiracy; and 4) Dodd's posses-
sion was reasonably foreseeable to Hayes. 91
B. Firearm Offenses
The use of Pinkerton liability to hold conspirators responsible
for the actions of their co-conspirators may be most prevalent in
the context of firearm offenses. More specifically, Pinkerton liabil-
ity is often applied to increase a defendant's sentence via 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) when a gun is used in a drug offense. 92 Before ex-
amining examples of Pinkerton liability in this area, it is impor-
tant to note that the mandatory minimum sentence found in 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) has been declared an unconstitutional violation of
the Sixth Amendment by the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Harris.93 However, the holding in Harris does not substantially
change the use of Pinkerton liability in this area. Harris merely
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 962.
91. Hayes, 391 F.3d at 963.
92. 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(a) (2005) provides:
Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by
this subsection or any other provision of law, any person who, during and in rela-
tion to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime that provides for enhanced punishment if committed by
the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be
prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in
furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the pun-
ishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime - (i) be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.
93. 397 F.3d 404, 412-14 (6th Cir. 2005). In Harris, the court held that after the United
States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), "the
[flirearm-[t]ype [pirovision enhancements [must] be charged in the indictment and proved
to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 413-414.
2006
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requires that any "firearm-type" enhancement be found beyond a
reasonable doubt by a jury instead of a sentencing judge.94
The Second Circuit has held that the "carry" provision of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) is directly violated under Pinkerton if "a firearm is
carried by, or within the reach of," a co-conspirator during a predi-
cate drug offense. 95 In United States v. Giraldo, the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and use of a
firearm during and in relation to narcotics trafficking.96 These
convictions stemmed from a cocaine transaction during which the
defendant was arrested. 97 During the attempted transaction, the
defendant was in a car with two other co-conspirators. 98 He was
not driving the car nor did he own the car. 99 In a later search of
the car at police headquarters, an officer discovered a loaded fire-
arm.10 0 Each conspirator was convicted of a firearm violation
based on the presence of this gun, although it was only found in a
later search of the car and never in the actual possession of any
conspirator. 101
For a firearm conviction under Pinkerton, the "co-conspira-
tor's carrying of the gun must merely have been foreeseably in fur-
94. Harris, 397 F.3d at 413-414.
95. United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 847
(1996).
96. Id. at 671.
97. Id. at 672.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. There was a split in the Circuits as to the proper definition of the term "carry." The
Second, Sixth and Ninth Circuits required that a gun be immediately accessible to be "car-
ried." Giraldo, 80 F.3d at 676-77; United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th
Cir. 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 1996). Some Circuits
took the Second Circuit's application of the "carry" provision of 924(c) one step further. See,
e.g., United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997) (agreeing with the Fourth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits that a gun may be "carried" in a vehicle even if it is not imme-
diately accessible to the defendant); United States v. Quinn, 123 F.3d 1415 (11th Cir.
1997).
The United States Supreme Court resolved this split and adopted the more liberal
view of the term "carry." Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (holding that
"carrying a firearm" is not limited to carrying firearms on one's person and that both carry-
ing weapons in the trunk of a vehicle and in a locked glove compartment constitutes "carry-
ing a firearm" under the statute).
Thus, if a defendant in a drug conspiracy is riding in a car owned and driven by a co-
conspirator and the co-conspirator has a gun in the trunk, the defendant could be convicted
under Pinkerton of carrying a firearm as long as it was reasonably foreseeable that a gun
would be carried in furtherance of the conspiracy. This is true whether or not the defen-
dant knew that the co-conspirator had a gun in the trunk.
Vol. 67
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 67 [2006], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/4
PINKERTON V. UNITED STATES
therance of the conspiracy." 10 2 In Rodriguez v. United States, evi-
dence at trial showed that Raul Rodriguez was a member of a co-
caine conspiracy, stored cocaine in his apartment, transported
cocaine, sold cocaine directly to customers, and prepared cocaine
for sale. 10 3 There was also evidence that a co-conspirator acted as
an armed lookout during these transactions. 0 4 Based on this evi-
dence, the court noted that the evidence "clearly allowed a jury to
conclude that Rodriguez knew, or foresaw, that a gun was carried
in connection with his narcotics activities."105 Thus, although
Rodriguez was involved only in the drug activity and did not actu-
ally carry a gun, he was found guilty of carrying a firearm because
of the mere presence of an armed co-conspirator.
Although Rodriguez actually knew that a gun was present,
knowledge of the presence of a firearm is not required. Other
courts have applied the foreseeability standard that the Rodriguez
court recognized but did not actually apply. In United States v.
Alvarez-Valenzuela,10 6 Miguel Alvarez-Valenzuela (Alvarez) was
involved in a one day marijuana conspiracy. 0 7 He was passing by
a friend's house in Mexico and the friend asked him to help carry
marijuana into the United States.108 Alvarez knew that the desti-
nation was the United States and knew that they would drop off
the marijuana near a fast food restaurant. 0 9 Border patrol
agents stopped Alvarez and two co-conspirators and found eighty-
three pounds of marijuana and a .380 caliber pistol on the ground
near the three men.110 Alvarez was subsequently convicted of va-
rious drug counts and one count of possession of a gun in relation
to a drug trafficking crime."' On appeal, Alvarez contested the
firearm conviction, claiming he did not know anyone had a gun
until the federal agents appeared." 2 The court held that under
Pinkerton, the jury need not have found that the defendant actu-
ally knew that guns were being used, only that Alvarez could have
102. Rodriguez v. United States, No. 97 Civ. 2545, 2005 WL 887142, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
15, 2005).
103. Id. at *5 n.5.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 231 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2000).
107. Id. at 1203.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1200.
111. Id.
112. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d at 1204.
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reasonably foreseen the use of firearms. 113 The court found that
Alvarez could have foreseen the use of firearms due to the value of
the marijuana and violence of the drug trade and illegal border
crossings, as well as the fact that it was unlikely he did not know
that his co-conspirator had a gun. 114
In a similar holding, the Seventh Circuit held that Reynaldo
Diaz could be sentenced to an additional five years for use of a
firearm in a drug trafficking crime when his co-conspirator pos-
sessed the gun. 1 5 Concluding that Diaz could be convicted under
a Pinkerton theory of liability, the court stated, "the illegal drug
industry is, to put it mildly, a dangerous, violent business. When
an individual conspires to take part in a street transaction involv-
ing a kilogram of cocaine worth $39,000, it certainly is quite rea-
sonable to assume that a weapon of some kind would be car-
ried.""l 6
Pinkerton liability is also used to obtain firearm convictions
for far more serious offenses. For example, in United States v.
Curtis,1 7 William Curtis was convicted of conspiracy to distribute
crack cocaine.1 8 During the conspiracy, one of Curtis' co-conspir-
ators committed two violent murders. 1 9 Testimony indicated
that these murders were connected to the conspiracy and that
members of the conspiracy frequently used violence to achieve
their goals.' 20 As a result, the court found that the murders were
in furtherance of the conspiracy and it was foreseeable that mur-
der would be committed. 12' Thus, Curtis' additional convictions
for two counts of using a firearm to commit murder in furtherance
of a drug conspiracy were upheld, though Curtis did not actually
commit either murder. 122 Although a severe example, Curtis pro-
vides an excellent illustration of Pinkerton's implications. William
Curtis was guilty of a drug conspiracy, but did not kill anyone.
However, due only to his involvement in the drug conspiracy, he
was held responsible for two murders that he did not commit.
113. Id. at 1203.
114. Id. at 1203-05.
115. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 547-49 (7th Cir. 1988).
116. Id. at 549.
117. 324 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2003).
118. Id. at 503.
119. Id. at 503-06.
120. Id. at 506.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 503.
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C. Other Offenses
Although drug and firearm offenses are probably the two
most prevalent applications of Pinkerton liability in practice, Pin-
kerton is also used to convict defendants of a number of other sub-
stantive offenses. Other examples of the wide range of substan-
tive convictions via Pinkerton include money laundering, 123 aiding
and abetting the possession of stolen checks, 124 violations of the
Lacey Act's false-records provision,1 25 mail and wire fraud, 126 and
assault on a federal agent.127 These cases are not particularly
noteworthy to a discussion of Pinkerton and common law crime
other than to show the broad spectrum of offenses for which Pin-
kerton holds defendants vicariously liable. Indeed, if the elements
of Pinkerton are met, a defendant may be convicted substantively
of any federal offense without having personally committed the
offense.
IV. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON APPLICABLE CRIMINAL LAW
Before making any argument that Pinkerton creates a rule
that violates the prohibition on federal common law crimes, it is
necessary to provide a brief background on applicable criminal
law. This includes the law of conspiracy, and more importantly,
federal common law crimes.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Mathison 157 F.3d 541 (8th Cir.
1998).
124. United States v. Collazo, 815 F.2d 1138 (7th Cir. 1987).
125. United States v. Fountain, 277 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2001) (defendant was convicted of
violation of 16 U.S.C. § 3372(d) for creating false records to cover up violations of Louisiana
oyster laws). 16 U.S.C. § 3372(d) (2000) is the false records provision of the Lacey Act and
provides:
It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any false record, account, or label
for, or any false identification of, any fish, wildlife, or plant which has been or is
intended to be
(1) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or received from any for-
eign country; or
(2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
126. United States v. Boyd, 222 F.3d 47 (2nd Cir. 2000).
127. United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 1995).
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A. Conspiracy Law
1. History
Conspiracy developed due to the enactment of three statutes
during the reign'of Edward I in England. 128 Although not rooted
in common law, much of the law of conspiracy was shaped by
judges. Today, the definition of conspiracy sometimes differs by
jurisdiction depending on whether the jurisdiction retains com-
mon law crimes. 129 As discussed more thoroughly below, the
United States does not retain common law crimes, although some
of the states do.130
Because the United States does not retain common law
crimes, the crime of conspiracy is necessarily codified. The gen-
eral federal conspiracy statute is found at 18 U.S.C. § 371 and
reads in part:
[i]f two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned to not more than five years,
or both. 13 1
Thus, a conspiracy conviction under this general statute requires
proof of three essential elements: 1) an agreement between two or
more persons, the object of which is an offense against the United
States or to defraud the United States; 2) the defendant know-
ingly and willingly joined the conspiracy; and 3) at least one of the
co-conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy.1 32 It is important to note that 18 U.S.C. § 371 is only one
of the federal statutes under which conspiracy may be charged.
There are a number of additional federal statutes that attach con-
spiracy to particular substantive offenses. 133
The development of conspiracy law has been and continues to
be a controversial subject. Professor Wayne R. LaFave notes "the
128. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 12.1(a) (2d ed. 2003).
129. Id.
130. See infra text accompanying note 158.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
132. United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir. 2003).
133. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (conspiracy to restrain trade); 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2000)
(conspiracy to bribe in a sporting event); 18 U.S.C. § 286 (2000) (conspiracy to defraud the
federal government with fraudulent claims); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2004) (conspiracy to violate
the Controlled Substances Act); 21 U.S.C. § 963 (2004) (conspiracy to import or export a
controlled substance).
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elusive quality of conspiracy as a legal concept" and argues that
the prosecution has a distinct advantage in conspiracy cases.134
Professor LaFave lists five factors that he believes are responsible
for the prosecutor's advantage: 1) the inherent vagueness in the
crime of conspiracy; 2) the broad venue rules permitting prosecu-
tion to be at the place of agreement or at any place where an overt
act was committed; 3) the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule; 4) the wide latitude given to the prosecution to introduce any
evidence which even remotely tends to establish a conspiracy; and
5) the disadvantages for defendants of a joint trial.135
However, as Professor LaFave notes, despite many commen-
tators' skepticism over the development of conspiracy, most will
agree that conspiracy serves as a preventative means against
those with a disposition to commit crimes and as a means of com-
bating the unique danger of group criminal activity. 136
2. General Principles137
Conspiracy has been described as a partnership in crime. 38
Conspiracy is distinct from the substantive crime contemplated
and is charged as a separate offense.' 39 Thus, one can be charged
and convicted of conspiracy without ever being charged with a
substantive crime.
A conspiracy is the result of an agreement, not the agreement
itself.' 40 For conspiracy to exist, there must be an agreement to
commit an unlawful act, but the agreement does not have to be
formal, there need only be an understanding between the par-
ties. 14 ' However, mere presence at the scene of a crime or knowl-
edge of the conspiracy does not constitute an agreement. 42
134. LAFAVE, supra note 128, § 12.1(b). At least one prominent jurist agreed with this
argument. As Professor LaFave notes, Judge Learned Hand referred to conspiracy as "the
darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery." Id. (citing Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d
259 (2d Cir. 1925)).
135. Id.
136. Id. § 12.1(c).
137. A detailed overview of conspiracy law is not necessary, but knowledge of some
general principles is helpful to understanding the argument that follows. For a
comprehensive overview of federal conspiracy law, see Kathy Diener & Teisha C. Johnson,
Federal Criminal Conspiracy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463 (2005).
138. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946).
139. Diener & Johnson, supra note 137, at 463-64.
140. United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910).
141. 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAw § 679 (15th ed. 2004).
142. Diener & Johnson, supra note 137, at 468.
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Conspiracy also requires a dual mental state. 143 This means
that defendants must have both the intent required to commit the
crime contemplated and the intent to act together in carrying out
the common purpose. 144 Stated another way, in order to convict a
defendant of conspiracy, the government must prove that the de-
fendant knew of and joined the conspiracy with the intent to com-
mit the offenses that were its objectives. 145
In the federal system, most conspiracy statutes require an
overt act to be committed. 146 Only one conspirator must commit
an overt act, and the act need not be the substantive crime that
the conspiracy contemplated. 147 In fact, the overt act need not be
unlawful. 148 Nearly any action in furtherance of the agreement
will be considered an overt act. Examples include standing as a
lookout, taking a trip, making a telephone call and mailing a let-
ter. 149
Not all federal conspiracies require an overt act. In United
States v. Shabani,150 the United States Supreme Court found in
federal drug conspiracy statutes the agreement to conspire is the
act. The government is not required to also prove that a conspira-
tor committed an additional overt act.151
As noted earlier, an important distinction in conspiracy law is
that the conspiracy is a separate and distinct offense from the sub-
stantive offense that was the purpose of the conspiracy. 52 A per-
son may be convicted of both conspiracy and the substantive of-
fense, even though the substantive offense was alleged as the
overt act necessary to convict of conspiracy. 53 It does not matter
that the purpose of the conspiracy was not accomplished nor does
it matter if the purpose of the conspiracy was impossible to be ac-
complished. 154
143. 4 TORCIA, supra note 141, § 680.
144. Id.
145. United States v. Ceballos, 340 F.3d 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2003).
146. Diener & Johnson, supra note 137, at 474.
147. Id.
148. 4 TORCIA, supra note 141, § 680.
149. Id.
150. 513 U.S. 10 (1994).
151. Id. at 11.
152. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942).
153. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946).
154. United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270 (2003).
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B. Common Law Crimes
1. History
A common law crime is simply a crime "punishable under the
common law, rather than by force of statute. " 155 In other words, a
common law crime is defined by judges via case law instead of by
legislatures via statutes.
Development of criminal common law in this country began,
as did most American law, when colonists brought English com-
mon law with them to America. 156 Most states originally had com-
mon law crimes, but soon began to enact criminal statutes. 157
Many states eventually enacted comprehensive criminal codes
with some states retaining common law crimes and some ex-
pressly abolishing them. 58
The principal reason for common law crimes was that legisla-
tures in England sat infrequently and created little legislation. 59
This rationale for allowing judges to define crimes is no longer ap-
plicable. Today, a major argument in favor of retaining common
law crimes is that such a retention allows courts to "plug loop-
holes" in cases where the legislature did not criminalize some-
thing that ought to be a crime.' 60 This argument is tempered
somewhat because few "loopholes" actually exist and legislatures
can generally remedy any oversights relatively quickly. 16'
The principal arguments that common law crimes should not
be retained are based on Constitutional concerns. One such con-
cern is that the criminal law ought to be certain, and allowing
judges to define criminal activity creates both due process and ex
post facto issues. 62 Another concern is that common law crimes
155. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 399 (8th ed. 2004).
156. 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 9 (15th ed. 2005).
157. Id.
158. For examples of states retaining common law crimes see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-303
(2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.01 (West 2005); and VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-16 (West 2004).
For examples of states expressly abolishing common law crimes see ALA. CODE § 13A-1-4
(2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-104 (West 2004); and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.031 (West
2004).
159. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 2.1(f) (2d ed. 2003).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. The obvious concern is that a person may engage in activity not previously
defined as criminal, only to have a judge decide that such activity is criminal after the fact.
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create separation of powers problems by allowing judges to both
create law and interpret it.163
Based largely on such concerns, in 1812 the United States Su-
preme Court declared that there can be no federal common law
crimes. 16 4 Although the history of federal common law crimes is a
long and contentious one that the Court chose largely to ignore,
the abolition announced in Hudson & Goodwin has remained good
law for nearly 200 years. 165
In Hudson & Goodwin, the Court held that there was no juris-
diction in federal courts to try criminal charges based on the com-
mon law, thus breathing life into the rule that all federal crimes
must be based on a statute of Congress. 166 This rule has been re-
stated numerous times by federal courts. The United States Su-
preme Court wrote that "[l]egislatures and not courts should de-
fine criminal activity."1 6 7 The Seventh Circuit described a federal
common law crime as "a beastie that many decisions say cannot
exist."168 Quoting the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit noted
that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require legislatures to specify the elements of criminal of-
fenses, writing, "[t]here are no constructive offenses; and, before
one can be punished, it must be shown that his case is plainly
within the statute."169
163. John S. Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the
Expansion of Federal Crimes, 54 Am. U. L. REV. 545, 573 n.179 (2005).
164. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). "By holding that
the federal courts lacked inherent common law powers, the Court gave formal definition to
the notion that the common law would operate only within the interstices of the Constitu-
tion's structure." Gary D. Rowe, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Good-
win, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101
YALE L.J. 919, 923 (1992).
165. See Rowe, supra note 164 for a detailed discussion of the history behind the aboli-
tion of common law crimes. Rowe quotes Thomas Jefferson as describing the battle over
common law crimes as "the most formidable of doctrines" that had "ever been broached by
the federal government." Id. at 919. For purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to know that
there are no federal common law crimes, whatever the reason for their abolition.
166. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. at 34.
167. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
168. United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 1998).
169. United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 101 (2d Cir. 2002), overruled by United
States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S.
620, 629 (1926)). Rybicki overruled the Handakas court's holding that a mail fraud statute
was unconstitutionally vague, but did not take issue with the court's description of the
rules regarding common law crimes. Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 144.
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2. Case Law Examining Common Law Crimes
Although federal courts rarely analyze whether a common
law crime has been created, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
have addressed the issue in some fashion. In United States v.
Lee, 170 the defendant asserted that the Federal Death Penalty Act
(FDPA) was unconstitutional because the United States Supreme
Court in effect created a common law crime when it interpreted
the Act in Ring v. Arizona.17 ' The FDPA required aggravating
factors for the death penalty to be applied, and the Eighth Circuit
interpreted the factors to be functional equivalents of the ele-
ments of an offense, thus requiring the factors to be found beyond
a reasonable doubt before the death penalty could be imposed. 172
The Lee court rejected the argument that the United States Su-
preme Court created a new common law crime by adding elements
to the offense.' 73 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that Ring did not
add elements to the offense but simply acknowledged the legisla-
ture's requirement that both the aggravated factors and elements
of the offense be found beyond a reasonable doubt for the death
penalty to be imposed. 174
The Seventh Circuit has also commented on the creation of
common law crimes in the context of mail and wire fraud statutes.
In Reynolds v. East Dyer Development Co. ,175 the Seventh Circuit
cautioned that giving mail and wire fraud statutes such broad def-
initions as to include all conduct that strikes a court as "sharp
dealing or unethical conduct"' 7 6 would "put federal judges in the
business of creating what would in effect be common law crimes"
due to the pervasive use of mail and telephone services and the
ease with which the mailing and wiring requirements in the stat-
utes are met.'
77
V. THE SUPREME COURT IMPERMISSIBLY CREATED CRIMINAL
LIABILITY IN PINKERTON
When the United States Supreme Court decided Pinkerton, it
created criminal liability for the substantive offenses of co-con-
170. 374 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2004).
171. Id. at 648 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).
172. Id. (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 609).
173. Id. at 648-49.
174. Id. at 649.
175. 882 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1989).
176. Id. at 1252.
177. Id. (quoting United States v. Holtzer, 816 F.2d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 1987)).
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spirators when Congress had not done so. Because the Pinkerton
theory imposes judge mandated criminal liability, it violates the
long-standing prohibition on federal common law crimes.
A. Is Pinkerton Liability a Common Law Crime?
The obvious place to begin an argument that Pinkerton liabil-
ity violates the prohibition on federal common law crimes is to as-
sert that the Pinkerton theory itself is a common law crime. Logi-
cally, to be considered a common law crime, the Pinkerton theory
must arise from the common law rather than from statute and
must constitute a crime.
The Pinkerton theory is clearly a common law doctrine and
not statutory in nature. A search of the United States Code will
reveal no statute prescribing that a conspirator may be held crimi-
nally responsible for the substantive offenses of his or her co-con-
spirators. In addition, the Supreme Court relied almost solely on
common law in formulating the rule in Pinkerton. In its analysis,
the majority cited only a general conspiracy statute requiring an
overt act. 178 Courts openly acknowledge that the Pinkerton theory
is a judicial rule. The Ninth Circuit has described the Pinkerton
theory as, "a judicially-created rule that makes a conspirator crim-
inally liable for the substantive offenses committed by a co-con-
spirator when they are reasonably foreseeable and committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy. " 1 79
The issue of whether the Pinkerton theory is a crime is less
clear. A crime is an "act that the law makes punishable" or "the
breach of a legal duty treated as the subject matter of a criminal
proceeding.' 80 A crime requires that a defendant commit an un-
lawful act and have the requisite mental state or wrongful intent
(mens rea).18 1
Concededly, Pinkerton liability is not a crime in the tradi-
tional sense. Prosecutors do not actually charge defendants with
Pinkerton liability as they would charge a defendant with murder,
178. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). The Court cited 18 U.S.C.
§ 88 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2004)). 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2004) is the gen-
eral conspiracy statute quoted in the text above. See supra text accompanying note 131. In
1948, Congress consolidated 18 U.S.C. § 88 and 18 U.S.C. § 294 into the general statute,
which no longer contains a requirement for an overt act. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62
Stat. 701.
179. United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002).
180. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1006-1007 (8th ed. 2004).
181. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 4 (2005).
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assault, or any other substantive offense. Rather, a defendant is
charged with conspiracy and also charged with a substantive of-
fense via Pinkerton liability. The distinction is important; a de-
fendant is not punished for Pinkerton liability, he or she is pun-
ished for a substantive offense because of Pinkerton liability.
An analysis of the act and mental state required for Pinkerton
liability does not neatly conform to a traditional analysis. The ele-
ments of Pinkerton liability can be restated as: 1) a conspiracy
existed; 2) one of the co-conspirators committed a substantive of-
fense; 3) the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of
the conspiracy; and 4) the commission of the substantive offense
was reasonably foreseeable.'1 2 Thus, two acts are required for a
person to be held liable for a substantive offense via Pinkerton.
First, an act constituting conspiracy must occur. That is, two or
more people must agree to commit an unlawful act.' 8 3 Addition-
ally, an act constituting some substantive offense must be commit-
ted by one of the conspirators.
Multiple mental states are also required for punishment
under the Pinkerton theory. First, the defendant must have the
requisite mental state for conspiracy. The conspirator committing
the substantive offense must also have the requisite mental state
for the substantive offense. The requirement that the substantive
offense be reasonably foreseeable also contains a mental state re-
quirement. Essentially, the reasonably foreseeable requirement
seems to mean that if it would be negligent for a defendant not to
know that a substantive offense of the kind committed might be
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, the defendant can be
held responsible.
These factors convolute the analysis of Pinkerton liability as a
crime in a number of ways. The defendant does not commit the
act or have the mental state required for the substantive offense.
However, those requirements must be met by a co-conspirator for
the defendant to be punished. The defendant need only commit
the act and have the mental state necessary for conspiracy. This
means that the defendant commits conspiracy, a crime in and of
itself, and then sits back and waits. If a co-conspirator commits a
substantive offense in furtherance of the conspiracy, the defen-
dant is also punished for it simply because he or she committed
the crime of conspiracy.
182. United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Hayes
391 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2004); Long, 301 F.3d at 1103.
183. 4 ToRcIA, supra note 141, § 679.
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The reasonably foreseeable element is also problematic. Al-
though the element contains shades of negligent mental state re-
quirements as argued above, it is not truly a mental state required
for punishment. The focus is on whether the substantive offense
was reasonably foreseeable, an objective standard. Thus, there is
no additional mental state requirement, but there is an objective
requirement that the substantive offense be reasonably foresee-
able. This additional requirement for liability under Pinkerton
certainly exists, but is difficult to incorporate into an analysis of
act and mental state because it is truly neither.
For these reasons, it seems fair to conclude that Pinkerton lia-
bility itself is not actually a crime. Although the Pinkerton theory
has elements that must be met just like elements of a traditional
crime, the lack of a requirement for an additional act or mental
state takes Pinkerton liability outside the definition of a crime.
Since Pinkerton liability is not a crime, it logically cannot be a
common law crime. However, the analysis of whether or not Pin-
kerton liability violates the prohibition of federal common law
crimes cannot end here.
B. Pinkerton Liability is Sufficiently Analogous to a Common
Law Crime that it Violates the Prohibition Against
Federal Common Law Crimes
Although not a common law crime, Pinkerton liability violates
the spirit of the prohibition against federal common law crimes.
The prohibition prevents judges from creating criminal liability
where the legislature has not done so. If nothing else, the Pinker-
ton theory creates criminal liability.
Citing 18 U.S.C. § 88 and various case law, the Supreme
Court concluded in Pinkerton that:
[ilf [the overt act statutorily required for the crime of conspiracy]
can be supplied by the act of one conspirator, we fail to see why the
same or other acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are likewise not
attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them responsi-
ble for the substantive offense.' 84
Unfortunately, what the Court failed to see is that a conspirator
cannot be criminally liable for the substantive offenses of a co-con-
spirator because Congress has not statutorily created such crimi-
nal liability.
184. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
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In United States v. Bass, the Supreme Court interpreted 18
U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1968) to determine whether it was a crime for a
convicted felon to possess a gun.'8 5 The statute created federal
criminal liability for a felon receiving, possessing or transporting
"in commerce or affecting commerce" a firearm.18 6 The Court held
that Congress had not "plainly and unmistakably made it a fed-
eral crime for a convicted felon simply to possess a gun absent
some demonstrated nexus with interstate commerce."' 8 7 To sup-
port its interpretation of the statute, the Court noted that "legisla-
tures and not courts should define criminal activity" and that the
reason for this policy was that individuals should not "languish[]
in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said they should." 88
An examination of Pinkerton differs from Bass significantly as
statutory interpretation is not involved. The Court's interpreta-
tion in Bass does, however, provide the reasons that the Pinkerton
theory must be codified if it is to exist. The most obvious of these
reasons is that legislatures and not courts should define criminal
activity. The Pinkerton theory was defined by the Supreme Court
and Congress has never codified the Court's rule. If one looks fur-
ther in Bass to the Court's statement that the policy behind this
rule is that individuals should not be imprisoned without a clear
legislative statement, it becomes clear that the Court is concerned
with judicially-defined criminal liability. Under Pinkerton, many
defendants are languishing in prison even though no lawmaker
has said they should.
The case of William Curtis, examined earlier, 8 9 clearly illus-
trates this argument. Curtis was convicted of a conspiracy to pos-
sess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack co-
caine, 190 a crime for which the legislature has clearly stated he
should be imprisoned.' 91 Curtis was also convicted of two counts
185. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1968).
187. Bass, 404 U.S. at 348-49 (citing United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485
(1917)).
188. Id. at 348.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
190. United States v. Curtis, 324 F.3d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 2003).
191. Curtis was convicted of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846. That statute provides:
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this sub-
chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense,
the commission of with was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.
21 U.S.C. § 846 (2004). The penalties for possession with intent to distribute more than
fifty grams of crack cocaine are found in 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2004). Curtis was sentenced to
life for the conspiracy. Curtis, 324 F.3d at 504.
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of using a firearm to commit murder in furtherance of a drug con-
spiracy. 192 Curtis did not actually commit either of the two
murders for which he was convicted, but one of his co-conspirators
did. 193 Thus, Curtis' convictions for the murders were based
solely on Pinkerton. Curtis was sentenced to two life sentences
plus sixty years for the murders under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). 194 No
legislature has ever stated that Curtis should be punished for
murders he did not commit. He was punished for the murders be-
cause the United States Supreme Court's Pinkerton reasoning dic-
tated he should be punished. This court-created criminal liability
clearly violates the spirit and policy behind the prohibition of fed-
eral common law crimes. Theoretically, William Curtis could lan-
guish in prison for two lifetimes plus sixty years based on the Pin-
kerton theory because a court, not a legislature, defined the crimi-
nal liability.
The troubling aspects of Pinkerton are most obvious in an ex-
ample such as Curtis. Most people dislike the idea that a person
could be convicted of murders he did not commit simply because
the person was involved in a drug conspiracy. However, more
common applications of Pinkerton are no less troubling. For ex-
ample, Person A and Person B conspire to distribute drugs. Per-
son A buys the drugs from a supplier, stores them and then sells
them. Person B serves as the lookout for the transactions. Both
Person A and Person B are certainly guilty of conspiracy. Person
A is also guilty of possession with intent to distribute. However,
due to Pinkerton, Person B is also guilty of possession with intent
to distribute.
This result may not seem particularly worrisome at first
glance. A natural reaction is that Person B should be just as
guilty as Person A and that possession of drugs is a natural part of
a drug conspiracy. The problem is that Person B never committed
the offense of possession with intent to distribute because Person
B never possessed the drugs. Thus, B is being punished for an
offense he did not commit, just like William Curtis. Person B com-
mitted only the offense of conspiracy and should be punished only
for conspiracy. Conspiracy is a separate and distinct offense from
any underlying substantive offense. The only reason that Person
B is also punished for the substantive offense of possession with
intent to distribute is that Pinkerton created such criminal liabil-
192. Curtis, 324 F.3d at 503, 506.
193. Id. at 503-06.
194. Id. at 504-05.
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ity. Although less eye-catching than the Curtis example, applica-
tion of Pinkerton in this fashion is far more common and equally
as troubling.
Pinkerton can be clearly distinguished from Lee, the case in
which the Eighth Circuit found that the United States Supreme
Court had not created a common law crime when interpreting the
Federal Death Penalty Act. 195 In Lee, the Eighth Circuit reasoned
that the Supreme Court did not create a federal common law
crime because the Court did not add elements to the Act, it simply
acknowledged that the legislature required enumerated aggra-
vated factors to be found beyond a reasonable doubt, just like ele-
ments of the offense. 196 The Pinkerton Court did no such thing.
In Pinkerton, the Court took the general conspiracy idea that an
overt act can be supplied by the act of one conspirator and ex-
tended the rule to mean that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy
can be attributed to all conspirators to hold them responsible for
substantive offenses. 197 The Court did not merely enforce a codi-
fied statute, it extended criminal liability far beyond that pro-
scribed by Congress.
The Seventh Circuit's caution against creating common law
crimes in a mail and wire fraud context is equally applicable to
Pinkerton. In Reynolds, the Seventh Circuit cautioned that ex-
tending mail and wire fraud statutes to include anything a court
deems unethical would create common law crimes because of the
ease with which the statutes are met. 198 The same caution in-
heres in extension of conspiracy law.
The Sixth Circuit explored this issue to some extent in United
States v. Minarek.199 The Minarek court relied largely on lan-
guage from Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Krulewitch v.
United States.200 The court noted that Justice Jackson argued:
'[the modern crime of conspiracy is so vague that it almost defies
definition'-that the charge of conspiracy was so 'elastic, sprawling
and pervasive' that, if not given judicially defined limits, it would
'constitute [H a serious threat to fairness in our administration of
justice.'2 0
195. United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2004). See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 170-74.
196. Lee, 374 F.3d at 649.
197. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
198. Reynolds v. East Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1252 (7th Cir. 1989).
199. 875 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1989).
200. 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
201. Minarek, 875 F.2d at 1192 (quoting Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 445-46 (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
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Justice Jackson also noted that although modern conspiracy law
has largely been shaped by judges, judges can not make offenses
against the United States. 20 2 The Minarek court then proceeded
to interpret the general conspiracy statute cautiously, so as not to
extend it and create a common law crime.20 3
Pinkerton differs from Reynolds and Minarek because no stat-
utory interpretation was involved. However, the caution urged by
both cases is quite applicable to Pinkerton. The underlying con-
cern in both Reynolds and Minarek is that if a court extends a
broad or vague area of criminal law too far, the court will create
what in effect would be impermissible common law crime. This
situation is precisely what happened in Pinkerton. The Pinkerton
Court took conspiracy, a vague and broad area of criminal law,
and extended it so far that the Court created criminal liability.
Also telling is that Congress has created at least one statute
which defines collateral manners in which criminal responsibility
can be assessed. Congress has declared that any person who
"aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures" the com-
mission of a federal offense is punished as the principal, even
though that person did not actually commit the crime.20 4 Mispri-
sion of felony, an offense in which a person is punished if he knows
of the commission of a federal felony offense and does not disclose
it to a judge or federal law enforcement, is also a somewhat collat-
eral manner of assessing criminal liability.20 5
As demonstrated by 18 U.S.C. § 2, Congress realized that it
has the authority to punish a person as a principal although the
person did not actually commit the offense. Yet Congress has
never chosen to prescribe punishment of a conspirator for the sub-
stantive offenses of a co-conspirator. None of the conspiracy stat-
utes contained in the United States Code allow for punishment of
a co-conspirator's substantive offenses. Both 18 U.S.C. § 371, the
general conspiracy statute, and 21 U.S.C. § 846, the drug conspir-
acy statute, provide punishments for conspiracy and conspiracy
alone.20 6 Neither these nor any other federal statute provides
that a person convicted of conspiracy can also be held liable for
substantive offenses they did not commit.
202. Id. (citing Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 456-57 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
203. Id. at 1192-96 (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 371).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2004).
206. See supra text accompanying note 131 and supra note 178.
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In fact, such a rule violates the long-standing principle of con-
spiracy law that conspiracy is an offense separate and distinct
from the substantive offense. Justice Rutledge notes this discrep-
ancy in his Pinkerton dissent. 207 One of the key points of Justice
Rutledge's dissent is that if Daniel Pinkerton had never joined the
conspiracy, he would be guilty of no offense. Under the majority
rule in Pinkerton, Daniel was guilty of both conspiracy and multi-
ple substantive offenses simply because he joined the conspir-
acy. 208 The same is true for all defendants convicted of substan-
tive offenses under Pinkerton.
It is difficult to reconcile this result with the principle that
conspiracy is a separate offense. If conspiracy is truly a separate
and distinct offense from the underlying substantive offense, join-
ing a conspiracy should only make a defendant guilty of the of-
fense of conspiracy. To be held liable for a substantive offense, the
defendant should necessarily commit a substantive offense.
Under the Pinkerton theory, a defendant who commits the offense
of conspiracy is guilty of not only conspiracy, but also of any fore-
seeable substantive offenses committed by a co-conspirator in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. This punishment for substantive of-
fenses simply by virtue of committing the "separate" offense of
conspiracy hardly seems to embody the concept that conspiracy is
a separate and distinct offense. Perhaps it is this inherent conflict
in the Pinkerton theory that has prevented Congress from codify-
ing it.
Whatever the reason, the Pinkerton theory is sufficiently
analogous to a common law crime that its application violates the
prohibition on federal common law crimes. There is no doubt that.
the Pinkerton theory is judge made. It is impossible to examine
the legislative history of Pinkerton because it does not exist. Pat-
tern jury instructions for Pinkerton make no reference to any stat-
ute because there is none to reference.20 9 Courts openly recognize
that the Pinkerton theory is a judicially created rule.210
There can also be no doubt that Pinkerton created criminal
liability where none previously existed. Without Pinkerton, a de-
fendant who entered a conspiracy could only be charged with, con-
victed of and punished for conspiracy. Unless the defendant actu-
ally committed a substantive offense, he could not be charged with
207. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 652 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
209. See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 8.20 (2003).
210. United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002).
2006
29
Manning: A Common Law Crime Analysis of Pinkerton V. United States
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2006
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
one. However, because the Pinkerton theory exists, a defendant
who enters a conspiracy can not only be punished for conspiracy,
but prosecutors may charge the defendant with substantive of-
fenses he did not commit.
The effect of the Pinkerton theory is exactly the result that
the prohibition on federal common law crimes seeks to prevent.
When the United States Supreme Court created the rule in Pin-
kerton, it created criminal liability where Congress had not done
so. Under the Pinkerton theory, defendants are punished under
criminal liability defined by courts instead of legislatures.
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1946, the United States Supreme Court announced the
Pinkerton theory, a rule allowing conspirators to be charged with
and convicted of the substantive offenses of co-conspirators if
those offenses were reasonably foreseeable and committed in fur-
therance of the conspiracy. 2 11 At the time, this rule did not exist
in any statute and Congress has not codified the rule in the nearly
sixty years since it was announced. Despite various challenges,
the Pinkerton theory has become widely accepted and is employed
often by federal prosecutors around the country.
The Pinkerton theory is probably most often used today to
convict defendants involved in drug conspiracies of substantive
drug and gun charges. It is also used to convict defendants of
other substantive offenses they did not commit, such as murder
and assault. Prosecutors may use the Pinkerton theory to convict
a defendant of any substantive offense they did not commit as long
as the defendant was a member of the conspiracy and the substan-
tive offense was reasonably foreseeable and committed by a co-
conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The Pinkerton theory is doubtless a judicially created rule. It
also clearly creates criminal liability where Congress has not done
so. As a result, the Pinkerton theory violates the prohibition on
federal common law crimes, a prohibition that has been in place
since 1812.212 Though not actually a common law crime, the Pin-
kerton theory accomplishes the exact result sought to be prohib-
ited: criminal liability prescribed by courts instead of legislatures.
There is no good explanation for this judicially created man-
ner of assessing criminal liability by common law instead of stat-
211. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640.
212. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812).
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ute. Congress, not the United States Supreme Court, should cre-
ate such a rule if it is to exist. Congress, in fact, is free to do so.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld Pinkerton over the
years, so it seems exceedingly unlikely that the Court would strike
down a statute that embodies the Pinkerton theory. Until Con-
gress sees fit to create such a statute, however, the Pinkerton the-
ory is an impermissible manner of assessing criminal liability.
Defendants should not be made to "languish in prison"213 due to a
judicial rule that is the equivalent of a federal common law crime.
213. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
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